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Software is playing increasingly important roles in avionics systems. It is widely used in
navigation and, in some cases, in control loops that maintain aircraft stability. To guarantee
the safety of flight systems, the FAA requires that critical components have a probability of
failure no greater than 10 -0 per hour of flight. The FAA suggests that a system should con-
tinually check itself to determine whether system components have failed so that appropriate
responses to failure can be made. Software is being used to diagnose system components for
failure. SIFT (Software Implemented Fault Tolerance) was a computer system developed to
study the use of software to check for failure and manage processor reconfiguration [Wen].
While software can play a useful role in checking the status of sensors and hardware com-
ponents, critical software must itself be ultrareliable. Many approaches are currently in use
to improve software reliability. They include using structured design techniques, compilers,
static analysis, and designing fault tolerance into the software. Although these approaches
can improve software reliability, none can guarantee with a high level of confidence that the
software satisfies its specifications.
To guarantee that software satisfies its specifications, formal verification can be used.
With this a program and its specification are viewed as mathematical objects, and a math-
ematical proof is used to show that the program and its specification are equivalent. Since
its initial study in the late 1960's, great strides have been made in formal verification.
Seml-automated theorem proving systems now exist that monitor and assist in software
verification [Hen, Ody].
Two important caveats come with formal verification. The first is that a verified program
is only as good as its specification. If the specification does not adequately reflect system
needs, then its software implementation will not either. The second caveat is that a verified
program will produce correct results only when the program is invoked with specified input.
A program executed upon unspecified or illegal input will produce unspecified results, and in
critical systems this can lead to tragedy. Even verified software must check input for legality
and respond appropriately if illegal input is detected.
In previous research [Sta], a theory of checking was developed to offer assistance in ana-
lyzing specifications and designing run-time checks. The theory is well suited for integration
with a formal approach to software specification and verification. In the theory, checking
is considered abstractly in terms of n-ary relations much like those of relational database
theory. Such relations provide an ideal representation of software specifications. Within the
theory checks are categorized, checks on input and checks on results are considered, and
formal attention is given to the minimization and logical combination of checks. The theory
consists of a framework of definitions and theorems for reasoning about checking.
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The focus of this summer's research has been upon input checks and the obstacles in
checking input to critical systems. A central concern, particularly for flight-critical software,
is with a property referred to as independence. The concern is with circumstances under
which it is possible to apply isolated, independent checks to separate sensor inputs and be
assured that all illegal input will be properly detected. The problem can be stated in terms
of a group of blind men inspecting an animal. When can the blind men, each inspecting
a separate part of the animal and exchanging no information, guarantee that the animal is
not an elephant? The answer can be explained easily when specifications (of software input
or of elephants) are viewed as n-ary relations. A relation can be checked by isolated checks
only if it possesses the property of independence.
When possible, input should be specified to be independent so that legality can be checked
easily. However, in real-time systems such as flight control systems that interact with the
physicM environment, dependence appears to be determined to a large extent by the envi-
ronment and cannot be "specified away." As a consequence, it may be very difficult to check
input for safety or legality.
Presently, we are investigating independence and checking in the context of the GCS
(Guidance and Control System) [Wit]. The GCS is a simulation of the Viking Mars Lander
environment. The simulator is intended for testing software that implements control laws for
landing the spacecraft. The lander input comes from sensors, internal parameters, and data
saved from previous frames. The large number of inputs and their complex interrelation-
ships provide an exciting context in which to investigate independence and the difficulties
of supplying input checks. At this stage we are focusing on independence of sensor input.
Later we hope to study the larger problem of all system input.
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